The moral justification of intellectual property is often called into question when placed in the context of pharmaceutical patents and global health concerns. The theoretical accounts of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick provide an excellent ethical framework from which such questions can be clarified. While Nozick upholds an individuals right to intellectual property, based upon its conformation with Lockean notions of property and Nozicks ideas of just acquisition and transfer, Rawls emphasizes the importance of basic liberties, such as an (...) individuals right to health, superceding such secondary rights as intellectual property rights. From a policy perspective, patent protection for pharmaceutical products necessarily entails the balancing of corporate intellectual property interests and public interests in healthcare. The moral dilemma that occurs when these two interests clash is not easily resolved. Aside from corporate and public interests, the state maintains an interest in creating and preserving policies that regulate the moral dilemma itself. This paper analyzes the economic and ethical factors surrounding the production and distribution of the anti-HIV medication, AZT. Potential policy implications and recommendations are also discussed. (shrink)

The author argues for a theory of responsibility for outcomes of imposed risk, based on whether it was permissible to impose the risk. When one tries to apply this persuasive model of responsibility for outcomes of risk imposition to procreation, which is a risk imposing act, one finds that it doesn’t match one’s intuitions about responsibility for outcomes of procreative risk. This mismatch exposes a justificatory gap for procreativity, namely, that procreation cannot avail itself of the shared vulnerability to risks (...) and their constraints—to the balance one is forced to strike between one’s interest in being free to impose risks on others and one’s interest in being safe from harm resulting from the risk imposed by others—which serves to justify risk imposition, generally. Whereas most risk impositions involve trade-offs of liberty and security among people who share the vulnerabilities associated with the taking, imposing, or being constrained from imposing risks, procreation involves the introduction of people into that position of vulnerability in the first place. Thus, when one procreates, one imposes risks in the absence of the shared vulnerability that usually serves as a justification for risk imposition. Procreative risks may not be wrongfully imposed, but they aren’t permissibly imposed in a manner fully comparable to other permissibly imposed risks. This makes procreation a unique form of risk imposition, with unique implications for its justification and for one’s responsibility for its outcomes. This insight can help explain several puzzling procreative asymmetries. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe remarkable progress in modern genetic technology enables the identification of genes causing devastating diseases and thereby the development of tools for prenatal diagnosis and carrier detection. To implement the results of genetic research in traditional societies, where genetic diseases are more prevalent due to inbreeding, necessitates a culturally appropriate approach that also promotes traditional and societal values important to the relevant community. This paper presents our experience with implementing the results of modern genetic research among the traditional community (...) of the Negev Bedouin of Israel. Although the benefit of using those results for the prevention of genetic diseases seems obvious, successful implementation relies on a carefully designed educational program aimed at changing culturally related attitudes and perceptions. Such a program should attend to the needs of the community and be sensitive to its traditional values. (shrink)

This paper investigates connections between procreative ethics and the ethics of suicide and euthanasia. While there are good reasons for distinguishing between lives worth starting and lives worth continuing, I argue that those reasons provide no reason for denying that there is a relationship between procreative and end of life ethics. Regarding euthanasia/assisted suicide, we might think it too demanding to ask parents to help euthanize their terminally ill, suffering child, but had the parents not procreated, thereby exposing their child (...) to life's risks, their child wouldn't need euthanizing. If you need help killing yourself, shouldn't your parents, who got you into life in the first place – without your consent – help you out of it? Yet knowing that your parents would help you kill yourself may increase your desire to die. A conundrum. Regarding suicide, the fact that we are forced into life should bolster the right to suicide, even for reasons that others might find wanting. The ways in which we are brought into life have moral implications for the ways in which we are entitled to get out of it. (shrink)

BackgroundVaccination against human papillomavirus (HPV) is a pivotal tool for preventing a significant cause of cervical cancer. One particular culturally recognized context associated with negative attitudes toward the HPV vaccine is the religiousness of parents. However, relatively speaking, there remains a scarcity of studies that have focused specifically on religious groups, especially non-Christian groups. PurposeTo better understand the basis for members of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish community to object to the HPV vaccine and how such objections can and cannot be reduced, (...) thereby improving cultural competence—namely, the cultural understanding and ethical addressing of HPV vaccination refusal. MethodsThis qualitative study conducted semi-structured interviews with ten Israeli ultra-Orthodox mothers who are opposed to administering the HPV vaccine to their daughters. The content analysis addressed these results and extracted the major issues arising from these particular interviews. ResultsFour main novel insights were found pertaining to the negative stance toward HPV vaccination among mothers in an ultra-Orthodox Jewish community: (a) lack of knowledge about the HPV vaccine is not part of the reasoning against it; (b) rabbinical authority might have a lesser influence than expected for the moderation of HPV vaccine refusal; (c) complicated viewpoints regarding childhood vaccination may be the larger non-moderating context for HPV vaccination refusal; and (d) cultural competence is important for the ability to change the negative attitudes toward HPV vaccination. ConclusionsThe study may improve cultural competence regarding HPV vaccination and contribute to decreasing objections to the HPV vaccine in ultra-Orthodox communities. (shrink)

Having children is probably as old as the first successful organism. It is often done thoughtlessly. This book is an argument for giving procreating some serious thought, and a theory of how, when, and why procreation may be permissible.Rivka Weinberg begins with an analysis of the kind of act procreativity is and why we might be justifiably motivated to engage in it. She then proceeds to argue that, by virtue of our ownership and control of the hazardous material that (...) is our gametes, we are parentally responsible for the risks we take with our gametes and for the persons that develop when we engage in activity that allows our gametes to unite with others and develop into persons. Further argument establishes that when done respectfully, and in cases where the child's chances of leading a life of human flourishing are high, procreation may be permissible. Along the way, Weinberg argues that the non-identity problem is a curiously common mistake. Arguments intending to show that procreation is impermissible because life is bad for people and imposed on them without their consent are shown to have serious flaws. Yet because they leave us with lingering concerns, Weinberg argues that although procreation is permissible under certain conditions, it is not only a welfare risk but also a moral risk. Still, it is a risk that is often permissible for us to take and impose, given our high level of legitimate interest in procreativity. In order to ascertain when the procreative risk is permissible to impose, contractualist principles are proposed to fairly attend to the interests prospective parents have in procreating and the interests future people have in a life of human flourishing. The principles are assessed on their own merits and in comparison with rival principles. They are then applied to a wide variety of procreative cases. (shrink)

This essay responds to criticisms of and reflections on A Theory of Truces offered by Keith Breen, David Lyons, Colleen Murphy and Thaddeus Metz. I focus on the place of truces within just war theory, the permissibility of making truces with particularly unsavory actors, the tension between present and future considerations in truce making, and Truce Thinking as an instance of non-ideal theory.

Teleological theories of reason and value, upon which all reasons are fundamentally reasons to realize states of affairs that are in some respect best, cannot account for the intuition that victims in non-identity cases have been wronged. Many philosophers, however, reject such theories in favor of alternatives that recognize fundamentally non-teleological reasons, second-personal reasons that reflect a moral significance each person has that is not grounded in the teleologist’s appeal to outcomes. Such deontological accounts appear to be better positioned to (...) identify the wrong committed against non-identity victims because a person wrongs another on such accounts if she violates his second-personal claims -- overall benefit to victims presents no obstacle to the identification of second-personal wrongdoing. Derek Parfit argues that non-identity is a problem for these deontological theories as well because the alleged victims are properly understood as consenting to the action in question, thereby waiving any such second-personal claim. But his arguments misrepresent the role of consent on such theories by articulating it through appeal to the very teleological theory of reasons that their advocates dismiss as inadequate. Properly understood, Parfit’s appeal to consent understood as retroactive endorsement only provides the answer on such deontological accounts to the question of whether, given that the non-identity victim is second-personally wronged, he is nonetheless better off existing. Indeed, it becomes clear that it is teleological theories for which non-identity poses a particular problem: they cannot -- while their deontological counterparts can – account for the intuition that non-identity victims have been wronged. (shrink)

Sperm donation is a widely accepted and increasingly common practice. In the standard case, a sperm donor sells sperm to an agency, waives his parental rights, and is absolved of parental responsibility. We tend to assume that this involves no problematic abandonment of parental responsibility. If we regard the donor as having parental responsibilities at all, we may think that his parental responsibilities are transferred to the sperm recipients. But, if a man creates a child accidentally, via contraception failure, we (...) tend to assume that the man does indeed have parental responsibilities. Assessing these contrasting conclusions requires a theory of parental responsibility. I analyze prevalent theories of what makes someone parentally responsible and show that none of these theories can withstand scrutiny. I propose a new theory of parental responsibility, which, I argue, is more plausible than the alternatives. My theory of parental responsibility is based on our ownership and control over hazardous materials, namely, our gametes. I show that neither my theory, nor the theories I reject, can support our contrasting intuitions. I conclude that sperm donors are fathers, with parental responsibility. I argue that the alternative conclusion, that neither sperm donors nor accidental fathers are parentally responsible for their resulting offspring, is less plausible. I then consider whether parental responsibility can be transferred and argue that it is far from clear that it can. Finally, I address objections and consider some practical implications of these views. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible. I argue against Harmon’s (...) and Woodward’s direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the NIP. My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the NIP only arises when we concern ourselves with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the NIP is dissolved. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I examine five arguments against removing controversial monuments. I argue that none of these arguments provides good reasons for leaving controversial monuments in place. A close examination of these arguments also points to some of our misconceptions about the nature of monuments. The arguments include the claim that removing monuments rewrites history, that removal amounts to ex-post facto moralizing, that controversial monuments are needed to stir people to healthy debate, that the focus on monuments is a distraction preventing us (...) from making pragmatic progress, and that removing some monuments is the first step in a slippery slope that will lead to excessive censure of historical figures. (shrink)

A great deal of theorizing has emerged about the economic ramifications of increased automation. However, significantly less attention has been paid to the potential effects of AI-driven occupational replacement on less measurable metrics—in particular, what it feels like to be replaced. In politics, we see examples of nation-states and extremist groups invoking the concept of replacement as a motivator for political action, unrest, and, at times, violence. In the realm of workplace automation, and in particular, in the case of AI-driven (...) workplace automation, the replacement of human labor with artificial labor is an explicit goal. In this paper, we suggest that, given the effects that the experience of a sense of replacement has in political contexts and the potential for that sense of replacement to motivate unrest and violence, we should be concerned about the widely predicted replacement of workers over the coming decades beyond the potential economic challenges which may arise. (shrink)

Life is pointless. That’s not okay. I show that. I argue that a point is a valued end and that, as agents, it makes sense for us to want our efforts and enterprises to have a point. Valued ends provide justifying reasons for our acts, efforts, and projects. I further argue that ends lie separate from the acts and enterprises for which they provide a point. Since there can be no end external to one’s entire life since one’s life includes (...) all of one’s ends, leading and living one’s life as a whole cannot have a point. Finally, I argue that since we live our lives and structure our living­a­human­life efforts both in parts and as a whole, it is fitting to be sad to recognize that leading and living a life is pointless. My discussion helps make sense of the literature that frequently talks around this topic but often does so vaguely and indirectly. (shrink)

One might think that parental obligation to children ends with the end of childhood. I argue that if we consider why parents are obligated to their children, we will see that this view is false. Creating children exposes them to life’s risks. When we expose others to risks, we are often obligated to minimize damages and compensate for harms. Life’s risks last a lifetime, therefore parental obligation to one’s children does too. Grown children’s autonomy, and grown children’s independent responsibility for (...) some of their own problems, can sometimes limit what parental responsibility demands of parents but it doesn’t do away with the responsibility. I argue that my conclusions are not as counterintuitive as they might initially seem. I also consider the implications that parental obligation to grown children might have on the oft assumed obligation that grown children have to care for their parents. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper, I argue that the most significant contribution of the Jesuits to early modern science consists in the introduction of a new “image of knowledge.”In contradistinction to traditional Scholasticism, this image of knowledge allows for the possibility of a science of hypothetical entities.This problem became crucial in two specific areas. In astronomy, knowledge of mathematical entities of unclear ontological status was nevertheless proclaimed certain. In theology, God's knowledge of the future acts of man, logically considered as future (...) contingents, was also proclaimed certain. In both cases the concept of certain knowledge of hypothetical entities was problematic and challenged a central premise of the accepted canons of logic, i.e., that the objects of true knowledge must be real objects.The main argument of this paper is that the practical orientation of the Jesuit cultural milieu enabled Jesuit scientists and theologians to ignore accepted logical considerations and to modify traditional Thomist images of knowledge. Nevertheless, this modification was not so radical as to change the contemporary organization of knowledge. This was due to the peculiar status of the Jesuits within the church establishment, which exposed them to harsh criticism and created a deep need for legitimation. Thus, the limitations of Jesuit scientific culture are accounted for in institutional, rather than in logical terms. (shrink)

In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non-identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – (...) often doesn't merit moral consideration since the alternative person one would have been had what might have happened actually happened is a merely possible person about whom one has no reason to care. He argues that his way of thinking can eliminate the non-identity problem. Caspar Hare argues that merely possible people have interests and are morally relevant. He argues that we can solve the non-identity problem by rejecting the view that merely possible people are morally irrelevant. Both Hare and Velleman argue that focusing on one's de dicto rather than on one's de re children can help us avoid the non-identity problem. I analyze the role that merely possible, nonexistent hypothetical entities ought to play in our moral reasoning, especially with regard to procreation. I refute both Velleman's and Hare's views and demonstrate the difficulties we encounter when we try to apply their views to common non-identity cases. I conclude with the common-sense view regarding who matters, morally: only those who do, did, or will exist. (shrink)

The Roman Marble Sculptures from the Sanctuary of Pan at Caesarea Philippi/Panias. By Elise A. Friedland. American Schools of Oriental Research Archaeological Reports, vol. 17. Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, 2012. Pp. xiii + 186, illus. $89.95. [Distributed by ISD, Bristol, Conn.].

The ArgumentThis paper, an attempt at an institutional history of ideas, compares patterns of reproduction of scientific knowledge in Catholic and Protestant educational institutions. Franciscus Eschinardus'Cursus Physico-Mathematicusand Jean-Robert Chouet'sSyntagma Physicumare examined for the strategies which allow for accommodation of new contents and new practices within traditional institutional frameworks. The texts manifest two different styles of inquiry about nature, each adapted to the peculiar constraints implied by its environment. The interpretative drive of Eschinardus and a whole group of “modern astronomers” is (...) here seen as pushing beyond the traditional task of “saving the phenomena,” towards celestial hermeneutics which is thoroughly experimental and mathematical. In spite of the insistence on physical interpretation of celestial phenomena, Eschinardus' astronomical discourse is yet constrained by a complex game of intellectual-political considerations. Commitment to the Thomistic organization of knowledge, which sets a boundary between a science of motion and the “geometry of heavens”, suppresses any impulse to ask about the mechanical causes of celestial appearances. The Copernican cosmology is thus rejected qua an attempt to cross this guarded boundary. Chouet in Geneva, by contrast, frees himself from these constraints on the organization of natural knowledge. By strictly separating philosophy from theology, he can combine physics and astronomy, favor a Copernican cosmology and adopt a Cartesian mechanistic worldview. Moreover, unlike the Jesuit Eschinardus, Chouet seeks toexplainnatural phenomena in terms of causes, rather than justinterpretthem. Yet he does so within a philosophical discourse largely scholastic in nature, which best suits the conservative institutional framework in which he teaches. Whereas the Jesuit Eschinardus employs a new type of discourse without severing his links with the traditional Thomistic worldview, the Calvinist Chouet adopts a new Cartesian worldview and adapts it to a largely traditional type of discourse. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that Ted Chiang’s short stories offer a realist philosophy of technology, one that charts a third course between the techno-pessimism and techno-optimism that characterize the history of philosophizing about technology and much of the speculative fiction about it. We begin by surveying the history of utopian and skeptical approaches to technology in philosophy and speculative fiction. We then move to discuss two of Chiang’s recent stories and use them to articulate the author’s techno-realism. Chiang’s view, (...) as it is developed in these stories, has three features: First, technology is not merely an agent of de-skilling, it can also promote self-knowledge and insight. Second, technology is not only an agent of alienation it can also provide succor and psychological relief. Finally, technology does not necessarily remake us into new beings with new capacities and needs. In many cases, it just gives us further avenues to be what we already were - to act on the tendencies and pursue the needs we always had. (shrink)

The most contentious aspect of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) concerned its amnesty‐granting powers. In return for perpetrators providing full disclosure about their crimes, the TRC was authorized to release them from both criminal responsibility and civil liability. This essay takes up the thorny question of how such a commission might be morally justified. Part 1 discusses the political circumstances that led to the creation of the TRC. Part 2 provides a critical survey of some previous attempts to (...) justify the commission's work. Part 3 offers a new justification, grounded in Adam Smith's notion of sympathy; after outlining some of the benefits of sympathy for political reconciliation, I argue that the work of a South African–style truth commission can promote sympathy between former enemies. (shrink)

Human life is absurd because it is too short relative to reasonable human purposes. In contrast to our absurd relationship to time, our relationship to space is not absurd. Although our lives are way too short for reasonable human purposes, we are adapted to our size and the space we have to live in relative to the space of the universe and relative to reasonable human purposes. Because the human lifespan is so short as to render human life absurd, human (...) life is also meaningless because absurdity presents an obstacle to meaningfulness. (shrink)

This paper suggests that there are three kinds of meaning: Everyday, Cosmic, and Ultimate. Everyday meaning refers to the value and significance in our everyday lives, including values such as beauty, morality, and truth, and the significance of engagement with them. Cosmic meaning refers to our meaningful role in the cosmos: to the significance and value of our cosmic niche, to the purposes of the cosmos and our place in it. Ultimate meaning is the end-regarding justifying reason, the valued end, (...) or the point of leading a life at all. It is here argued that procreating can be a deep source of Everyday meaning, and perhaps Cosmic meaning. But nothing can provide us with Ultimate meaning. The implications this may have for procreative ethics is considered. (shrink)

This paper offers a justification of the principle of military proportionality that is based in considerations of self-interest. By offering such a justification, I hope to vindicate the principle on the basis of the least controversial argument available. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 is used as a case study. Part 1 surveys recent work on military proportionality and suggests that the importance of this principle has increased in the age of asymmetrical warfare. Part 2 (...) considers and rejects the traditional realist concerns about proportionality. Part 3 offers a realist rationale for adhering to the principle. (shrink)

What is a disability? What sorts of limitations do persons with disabilities or impairments experience? What is there about having a disability or impairment that makes it disadvantageous for the individuals with it? Are persons with severe cognitive impairments capable of making autonomous decisions? What role should disability play in the construction of theories of justice? Is it ever ethical for parents to seek to create a child with an impairment? This anthology addresses these and other questions and is a (...) valuable addition to a growing interdisciplinary literature exploring issues at the intersection of disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics. Most of the authors are well-known from their previous work in the disability field and have already made significant philosophical contributions to it. (shrink)

The most contentious aspect of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) concerned its amnesty‐granting powers. In return for perpetrators providing full disclosure about their crimes, the TRC was authorized to release them from both criminal responsibility and civil liability. This essay takes up the thorny question of how such a commission might be morally justified. Part 1 discusses the political circumstances that led to the creation of the TRC. Part 2 provides a critical survey of some previous attempts to (...) justify the commission's work. Part 3 offers a new justification, grounded in Adam Smith's notion of sympathy; after outlining some of the benefits of sympathy for political reconciliation, I argue that the work of a South African–style truth commission can promote sympathy between former enemies. (shrink)

My dissertation investigates the requirements of procreative justice. The procreative justice problem is that parents' interest in procreation conflicts with children's interest in optimal birth conditions. Intergenerational reciprocity is the principle that adjudicates this conflict: reciprocity dictates that children demand no more of their parents' procreative practices than they themselves are willing to abide by as adults and dig parents only procreate in accordance with principles dig they would have wanted their own parents to have followed. I develop a Rawlsian (...) Contractualist theory, grounded in the view of justice as the principles that would result from self-interested rational choice under fair bargaining conditions, i.e. unbiased rational prudence over the course of a lifetime by agents who know that they will be born children and grow into adults who may want to procreate. ;This deliberation yields three principles: The Obvious Principle bans procreation that undermines the interests of both prospective parents and prospective children or involves risking/sustaining a major burden for the sake of a minor benefit. The Balance Principle permits procreation only when it would not be irrational for the prospective parent to accept for herself the very same risk her procreation imposes on her prospective child, in exchange for permission to procreate under these circumstances. The Motivation Restriction requires that procreation be at least partially, yet still prominently, motivated by a desire to raise, nurture, love, and care for one's future child once it is born. These principles are defended against rival principles and applied to a wide variety of cases. ;Stymied by metaphysical paradoxes and confusion about persons and existence, contemporary ethicists have struggled to formulate a sound theory of procreative justice that provides more than bare-bones consideration of children's interests. I argue that these efforts have failed. Whereas procreative liberty principles, including Feinberg's Birth Rights and Parfit's Non-Identity Problem principles, neglect children's interests, strictly paternalistic principles, e.g. Benatar's Asymmetry principle, neglect parental interests. My theory of procreative justice provides a much needed middle-ground position which promotes and protects the interests of prospective parents and children. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this paper three canonical studies of the scientific revolution are subjected to narratological analysis. Underlying this analysis is the assumption that in any single product of historical writing it is possible to distinguish, for analytical purposes, between three levels of reference: the object of the text — the events; the representation of the events — the narrative; and the text in which a story is represented by means of narrative. Through texts one learns about historical events, but also (...) about the process of producing the texts. Techniques of representation are means of production of texts that represent, in addition to the events, also the producer and his or her authority. The distinction made for any specific text allows the reader to play the two levels against each other in order to create a space within which historical writing should be criticized. Such criticism may draw attention to the difficulty of controlling the meaning of historical stories, and to the need to analyze narrative structures in order to appreciate the ideological changes of historical texts. (shrink)

This article responds to the two replies, published in this issue, to my article “Ultimate Meaning: We Don’t Have It, We Can’t Get It, and We Should Be Very, Very Sad,” published in the first issue of this journal. In the first reply, Turp, Hollinshead, and Rowe present an internalist challenge to my account of value, and a relational conception of the self as a challenge to my premise that leading a life includes everything you do and aim at within (...) the project, effort, or enterprise of living and leading a life. I respond to the internalist challenge by showing it does not succeed in inserting values into acts. I respond to the relational conception of the self by noting that, regardless of the nature of the self, the project of leading a life includes all the things you do and aim at within that project, effort, or enterprise. Thus, we can accept a relational account of the self and allow for other-regarding values but that does not change the location of our pursuit of those values: they remain located within the meta-project of leading a life, leaving the meta-project of leading and living a life with nowhere to reach for a point. In the second reply, Cowan argues against feeling sad about life’s pointlessness. In response, I argue that sad facts warrant sadness. I further argue that there are reasons other than happiness to value truth, including the very, very sad truth about the ultimate pointlessness of our lives. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of clinical-ethical decision making which will assist the health care professional to arrive at an ethically defensible judgment. The model highlights the integration between ethics and decision making, whereby ethics as a systematic analytic tool bring to bear the positive aspects of the decision making process. The model is composed of three major elements. The ethical component, the decision making component and the contextual component. The latter incorporates the relational aspects (...) between the provider and the patient and the organizational structure. The model suggests that in order to arrive at an ethically, justifiable sound decision one make reference to those three elements. (shrink)

What is a disability? What sorts of limitations do persons with disabilities or impairments experience? What is there about having a disability or impairment that makes it disadvantageous for the individuals with it? Are persons with severe cognitive impairments capable of making autonomous decisions? What role should disability play in the construction of theories of justice? Is it ever ethical for parents to seek to create a child with an impairment? This anthology addresses these and other questions and is a (...) valuable addition to a growing interdisciplinary literature exploring issues at the intersection of disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics. Most of the authors are well-known from their previous work in the disability field and have already made significant philosophical contributions to it. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis article confronts an old-new orientation in the historiographical literature on the “Galileo affair.” It argues that a varied group of historians moved by different cultural forces in the last decade of the twentieth century tends to crystallize a consensus about the inevitability of the conflict between Galileo and the Church and its outcome in the trial of 1633. The “neo-conflictualists” — as I call them — have built their case by adhering to and developing the “three dogmas of (...) the Counter-Reformation”: Church authoritarianism is portrayed by them as verging towards “totalitarianism.” A preference for a literal reading of the Scriptures is understood as a mode of “fundamentalism.” And mild skeptical positions in astronomy are read as expressions of “instrumentalism,” or “fictionalism.” The main thrust of the article lies in an attempt to historicize these three aspects of the Catholic reform movement. Finally, the lacunae in insufficiently explored historiographical landscape are delineated in order to tame the temptation to embrace the three dogmas, and to modify the radical conflictualist version of the story of Galileo and the Church. (shrink)

The problem of the difficulties created by disjunctive concepts is shown to be a spurious one. It is due in part to a confusion between concept formation and concept identification, in part to unfortunate terminological moves, in part to confusions between logical and methodological matters. Behind this pseudo-problem there are a number of real problems: how to work efficiently with partially interpreted concepts? are there differences in comprehension of various logical connectives? how does this comprehension change with age and linguistic (...) exposure? (shrink)

FAR FROM BEING A PURELY ESOTERIC CONCERN of theoretical mathematicians, the examination of the ontological status of mathematical entities, I submit, has far-reaching implications for a very practical area of knowledge, namely, the method of science in general, and of physics in particular. Although physics and mathematics have since Newton's second derivative been inextricably wedded, modern physics has a particularly mathematical dependence. Physics has moved and continues to move further away from the possibility of direct empirical verification, primarily because of (...) the increasingly complex logistical problems of experimentation within the parameters of the very large and of the very small. As certain areas become more and more theoretical, with developments of this century in astrophysics, cosmology, and quantum mechanics, and more specifically, with the postulation of new hypothetical elementary particles based almost exclusively upon mathematical data, physics is forced to depend increasingly upon mathematics as a method for verifying physical possibility. Typically, a mathematical formulation descriptive of an empirically established phenomenon x is manipulated and made subject to derivation on the assumption that the new formulation will continue to correspond with physical reality, and may even yield new information about the phenomenon's behavior. Why, however, should a coherence between the empirically-defined world and mathematical processes be assumed? This coherence is, above all, dependent upon a hidden metaphysically strong presupposition about the ontological status of mathematical entities and their systems. (shrink)

ArgumentThe paper offers a reading of Aquinas' treatise On Faith as a source of inspiration for later developments in the Catholic world of learning. My main argument is that Aquinas' attempt to interpolate his discourse on faith into a clear epistemological context had long-term intellectual and institutional implications. On the intellectual level Aquinas' discourse had the effect of blurring the ancient dichotomy between episteme/knowledge-science, and doxa/opinion-belief, that had presupposed an ontological difference between their objects. On the institutional level Aquinas' discourse (...) on faith allowed for the superposition of intellectual and political authority. The Jesuit educators of the early modern age, who identified themselves as Thomist, elaborated on the potential of the special configuration of knowledge and authority they had found in Aquinas' theology and transformed its principles into social-intellectual mechanisms to organize a framework in which to produce and transmit knowledge in the first global educational system. (shrink)

this article confronts an old-new orientation in the historiographical literature on the “galileo affair.” it argues that a varied group of historians moved by different cultural forces in the last decade of the twentieth century tends to crystallize a consensus about the inevitability of the conflict between galileo and the church and its outcome in the trial of 1633. the “neo-conflictualists” — as i call them — have built their case by adhering to and developing the “three dogmas of the (...) counter-reformation”: church authoritarianism is portrayed by them as verging towards “totalitarianism.” a preference for a literal reading of the scriptures is understood as a mode of “fundamentalism.” and mild skeptical positions in astronomy are read as expressions of “instrumentalism,” or “fictionalism.” the main thrust of the article lies in an attempt to historicize these three aspects of the catholic reform movement. finally, the lacunae in insufficiently explored historiographical landscape are delineated in order to tame the temptation to embrace the three dogmas, and to modify the radical conflictualist version of the story of galileo and the church. (shrink)

It seems we have some obligation to aid some others, but it's unclear why, to whom, and to what extent. Many consequentialists claim that we are obligated to help everyone to the marginal utility point but they do so without examining why we are obligated to aid others at all. I argue that we must investigate the basis of our duty to aid others in order to determine the nature and extent of our obligation. Although some consequentialists, notably, Kagan, Singer (...) and Unger, present arguments intended to justify some of consequentialism's most counter-intuitive demands, they take the less counter-intuitive demands for granted and justify the steeper demands on the basis of their relevant similarity to the more palatable ones. The result of this strategy is that many of consequentialism's steeper demands free-ride on a superficial similarity with less taxing demands. This allows consequentialism to broaden our obligations beyond the reach of justification. I examine three possible explanations of our duty to aid others, namely, intuition, fairness and self-interest, and argue that none of them justify consequentialism's runaway demands. (shrink)

There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important case study for (...) both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy. (shrink)

The principle of noncombatant immunity (NCI) lies at the heart of jus in bello or the moral rules governing the conduct of war. This paper takes up the status of NCI in asymmetrical wars (AW). The argument proceeds in six parts. In the first we present a skeptical or realist position about the feasibility of NCI in AW. Part two surveys the development of the idea of NCI. Part three provides an account of the logic and dynamics of AW. Part (...) four lays out a set of objections to the realist position. Part five imagines a realist rejoinder. In the final part we examine the moral and political implications of assuming that the realists are right about NCI in AW. We argue that even if they are, this does not imply the realist conclusion that “anything goes” in AW. In fact, we suggest that difficulties upholding NCI in AW may give rise to a special argument for conscientious objection. (shrink)

A Companion to Biblical Interpretation in Early Judaism. Edited by Matthias Henze. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012. Pp. xv + 568. $50.

We are likely to have immersive virtual reality and ubiquitous augmented reality in the coming decades. At least some people will use extended reality or “the metaverse” to work, play and shop. In order to achieve the best possible versions of this virtual future, however, we will need to learn from three decades of regulating the Internet. The new virtual world cannot consist of walled corporate fiefdoms ruled only by profitmaximization. The interests of workers, consumers and citizens in virtuality require (...) proactive legislation and oversight. -/- This white paper first addresses the central question the metaverse poses, whether virtual life is inherently more alienating and less authentic than face-to-face life experiences. This question is both a philosophical question about the nature of the good life and an empirical question about the accumulating evidence about the impacts of the digital on subjective well-being. -/- . (shrink)

of Tim Mulgan , , from Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.